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CN 34-1054/N

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Agriculture supply chain optimization based on supply and demand uncertainty with government subsidy policies

  • School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China

Cite this:
https://doi.org/10.3969/j.issn.0253-2778.2017.03.010
  • Received Date: 16 March 2016
  • Accepted Date: 30 May 2016
  • Rev Recd Date: 30 May 2016
  • Publish Date: 30 March 2017
    Abstract

  • Abstract

    Under the background of random output and random market demand of agriculture, and with government subsidies for the retailer, a one-period two-echelon supply chain optimization consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer was studied. A Stackelberg game between the manufacturer and the retailer was considered, and the existence of Stackelberg equilibrium was derived. The results show that the government subsidy policy can improve the supply chain’s total profit. In addition, an interesting finding shows that, under the reasonable government subsidies and exogenous parameters, the supply chain can be coordinated with a simple wholesale price contract, which does not happen in traditional cases.

    Abstract

    Under the background of random output and random market demand of agriculture, and with government subsidies for the retailer, a one-period two-echelon supply chain optimization consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer was studied. A Stackelberg game between the manufacturer and the retailer was considered, and the existence of Stackelberg equilibrium was derived. The results show that the government subsidy policy can improve the supply chain’s total profit. In addition, an interesting finding shows that, under the reasonable government subsidies and exogenous parameters, the supply chain can be coordinated with a simple wholesale price contract, which does not happen in traditional cases.
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    • References(20)
  • [1]
    ARROW K J, KARLIN S, SCARF H. Studies in the Mathematical Theory of Inventory and Production[M]. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958.
    [2]
    LEVITAN R E. The optimum reject allowance problem[J]. Management Science, 1960, 6(2): 172-186.
    [3]
    YANO C A, Lee H L. Lot sizing with random yields: A review[J]. Operations Research, 1995, 43(2): 311-334.
    [4]
    BOLLAPRAGADA S, MORTON T E. Myopic heuristics for the random yield problem[J]. Operations Research, 1999, 47(5): 713-722.
    [5]
    LI Q, ZHENG S. Joint inventory replenishment and pricing control for systems with uncertain yield and demand[J]. Operations Research, 2006, 54(4): 696-705.
    [6]
    HE Y, ZHANG J. Random yield risk sharing in a two-level supply chain[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2008, 112(2): 769-781.
    [7]
    CHO S H, TANG C S. Advance selling in a supply chain under uncertain supply and demand[J]. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2013,15(2): 305-319.
    [8]
    YAN X, WANG Y, HONG Z. Comparison of Bertrand and Cournot competitions under random yield[J]. International Journal of Production Research, 2015, 54(11): 1-21.
    [9]
    赵霞, 吴方卫. 随机产出与需求下农产品供应链协调的收益共享合同研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2009, 17(5): 88-95.
    [10]
    王道平, 程蕾, 李锋. 产出不确定的农产品供应链协调问题研究[J]. 控制与决策, 2012, 27(6): 881-885.
    [11]
    凌六一, 郭晓龙, 胡中菊, 等. 基于随机产出与随机需求的农产品供应链风险共担合同[J]. 中国管理科学, 2013, 21(2): 50-57.
    [12]
    TANG S Y, KOUVELIS P. Pay-back-revenue-sharing contract in coordinating supply chains with random yield[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2014.23(12): 2089-2102.
    [13]
    GAWANDE K, HOEKMAN B. Why governments tax or subsidize trade: Evidence from agriculture[R]. SSRN: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7787, 2010.
    [14]
    SUMNER D A. Farm subsidy tradition and modern agricultural realities[J]. The 2007 Farm Bill and Beyond, 2007: 29-33.
    [15]
    HOEKMAN B, OLARREAGA M, NG F. Reducing agricultural tariffs versus domestic support: what’s more important for developing countries?[R]. SSRN: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.2918, 2002.
    [16]
    顾和军. 农业税减免、粮食直接补贴政策对我国主要农产品国际竞争力的影响[J]. 国际贸易问题, 2008(8): 42-48.
    [17]
    王思舒, 王志刚, 钟意. 我国农业补贴政策对农产品生产的保护效应研究[J]. 经济纵横, 2011(4): 59-62.
    [18]
    王姣, 肖海峰. 我国良种补贴, 农机补贴和减免农业税政策效果分析[J]. 农业经济问题, 2007(2): 24-28.
    [19]
    曹帅, 林海, 曹慧. 中国农业补贴政策变动趋势及其影响分析[J]. 公共管理学报, 2012, 19(4): 55-63.
    [20]
    李强. 农业补贴对中国农产品国际竞争力的影响[J]. 改革与战略, 2015,31(11): 100-103.)
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    [1]
    ARROW K J, KARLIN S, SCARF H. Studies in the Mathematical Theory of Inventory and Production[M]. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958.
    [2]
    LEVITAN R E. The optimum reject allowance problem[J]. Management Science, 1960, 6(2): 172-186.
    [3]
    YANO C A, Lee H L. Lot sizing with random yields: A review[J]. Operations Research, 1995, 43(2): 311-334.
    [4]
    BOLLAPRAGADA S, MORTON T E. Myopic heuristics for the random yield problem[J]. Operations Research, 1999, 47(5): 713-722.
    [5]
    LI Q, ZHENG S. Joint inventory replenishment and pricing control for systems with uncertain yield and demand[J]. Operations Research, 2006, 54(4): 696-705.
    [6]
    HE Y, ZHANG J. Random yield risk sharing in a two-level supply chain[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2008, 112(2): 769-781.
    [7]
    CHO S H, TANG C S. Advance selling in a supply chain under uncertain supply and demand[J]. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2013,15(2): 305-319.
    [8]
    YAN X, WANG Y, HONG Z. Comparison of Bertrand and Cournot competitions under random yield[J]. International Journal of Production Research, 2015, 54(11): 1-21.
    [9]
    赵霞, 吴方卫. 随机产出与需求下农产品供应链协调的收益共享合同研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2009, 17(5): 88-95.
    [10]
    王道平, 程蕾, 李锋. 产出不确定的农产品供应链协调问题研究[J]. 控制与决策, 2012, 27(6): 881-885.
    [11]
    凌六一, 郭晓龙, 胡中菊, 等. 基于随机产出与随机需求的农产品供应链风险共担合同[J]. 中国管理科学, 2013, 21(2): 50-57.
    [12]
    TANG S Y, KOUVELIS P. Pay-back-revenue-sharing contract in coordinating supply chains with random yield[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2014.23(12): 2089-2102.
    [13]
    GAWANDE K, HOEKMAN B. Why governments tax or subsidize trade: Evidence from agriculture[R]. SSRN: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7787, 2010.
    [14]
    SUMNER D A. Farm subsidy tradition and modern agricultural realities[J]. The 2007 Farm Bill and Beyond, 2007: 29-33.
    [15]
    HOEKMAN B, OLARREAGA M, NG F. Reducing agricultural tariffs versus domestic support: what’s more important for developing countries?[R]. SSRN: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.2918, 2002.
    [16]
    顾和军. 农业税减免、粮食直接补贴政策对我国主要农产品国际竞争力的影响[J]. 国际贸易问题, 2008(8): 42-48.
    [17]
    王思舒, 王志刚, 钟意. 我国农业补贴政策对农产品生产的保护效应研究[J]. 经济纵横, 2011(4): 59-62.
    [18]
    王姣, 肖海峰. 我国良种补贴, 农机补贴和减免农业税政策效果分析[J]. 农业经济问题, 2007(2): 24-28.
    [19]
    曹帅, 林海, 曹慧. 中国农业补贴政策变动趋势及其影响分析[J]. 公共管理学报, 2012, 19(4): 55-63.
    [20]
    李强. 农业补贴对中国农产品国际竞争力的影响[J]. 改革与战略, 2015,31(11): 100-103.)
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