Return strategy for competing manufacturers under cap-and-trade regulation

In recent years, the booming development of the e-commerce platform economy has brought new momentum to economic growth. As a crucial commercial tool for businesses operating on online platforms, the return strategy has been widely of concern in industry and academia. On the one hand, return strategies can stimulate consumer demand and increase sales. On the other hand, the production process typically generates significant carbon dioxide emissions. Currently, governments are paying increasing attention to carbon emissions issues, and cap-and-trade regulation is one of the most widely adopted carbon emission policies by governments. This paper utilizes game theory models to investigate the issue of returns for competitive enterprises with energy consumption differences under the backdrop of cap-and-trade regulation. The study results indicate the following: First, controlling the cap can effectively control carbon emissions. Second, when the return cost and the difference in carbon consumption between the two manufacturers are low, it is optimal for both parties not to provide return service due to restrictions from cap-and-trade regulation and competitive pressures. Additionally, low-energy-consumption manufacturers have an advantage in competition. Furthermore, this paper explores the changes in parameters such as the profits and production quantities of competitive enterprises with variations in the cap. Consequently, it offers favorable suggestions for the government’s concerns during the implementation of carbon emission policies and provides practical guidance for manufacturers’ return decisions.