[1] |
SHAPLEY L S. A value for n-person games[C]// Contributions to the Theory of Games Ⅱ. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953: 307-317.
|
[2] |
BANZHAF J F Ⅲ. Weighted voting does not work: A mathematical analysis [J]. Rutgers Law Review, 1965, 19: 317-343.
|
[3] |
NOWAK A S, RADZIK T. A solidarity value for n-person transferable utility games [J]. International Journal of Game Theory, 1994, 23: 43-48.
|
[4] |
WEBER R J. Probabilistic values for games [C]// The Shapley Value. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988: 101-119.
|
[5] |
KAMIJO Y, KONGO T. Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2012, 216(3): 638-646.
|
[6] |
KAMIJO Y, KONGO T. Axiomatization of the Shapley value using the balanced cycle contributions property[J]. International Journal of Game Theory, 2010, 39(4): 563-571.
|
[7] |
KOJIMA K. On connections between individual values and coalition values for games in characteristic function form [J]. Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2014, 229: 60-69.
|
[8] |
CASAJUS A. The Shapley value without efficiency and additivity [J]. Mathematical Social Sciences, 2014, 68: 1-4.
|
[9] |
FLORES R, MOLINA E, TEJADA J. Pyramidal values [J]. Annals of Operations Research, 2014, 217(1): 233-252.
|
[10] |
HAMMER P L, HOLZMAN R. Approximations of pseudo-Boolean functions; applications to game theory [J]. Zeitschrift für Operations Research, 1992, 36(1): 3-21.
|
[11] |
SHAPLEY L S. Cores of convex games [J]. International Journal of Game Theory, 1971, 1(1): 11-26.
|
[12] |
RAPOPORT A, GOLAN E. Assessment of political power in the Israeli Knesset [J]. American Political Science Review, 1985, 79(3): 673-692.
|
[1] |
SHAPLEY L S. A value for n-person games[C]// Contributions to the Theory of Games Ⅱ. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953: 307-317.
|
[2] |
BANZHAF J F Ⅲ. Weighted voting does not work: A mathematical analysis [J]. Rutgers Law Review, 1965, 19: 317-343.
|
[3] |
NOWAK A S, RADZIK T. A solidarity value for n-person transferable utility games [J]. International Journal of Game Theory, 1994, 23: 43-48.
|
[4] |
WEBER R J. Probabilistic values for games [C]// The Shapley Value. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988: 101-119.
|
[5] |
KAMIJO Y, KONGO T. Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2012, 216(3): 638-646.
|
[6] |
KAMIJO Y, KONGO T. Axiomatization of the Shapley value using the balanced cycle contributions property[J]. International Journal of Game Theory, 2010, 39(4): 563-571.
|
[7] |
KOJIMA K. On connections between individual values and coalition values for games in characteristic function form [J]. Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2014, 229: 60-69.
|
[8] |
CASAJUS A. The Shapley value without efficiency and additivity [J]. Mathematical Social Sciences, 2014, 68: 1-4.
|
[9] |
FLORES R, MOLINA E, TEJADA J. Pyramidal values [J]. Annals of Operations Research, 2014, 217(1): 233-252.
|
[10] |
HAMMER P L, HOLZMAN R. Approximations of pseudo-Boolean functions; applications to game theory [J]. Zeitschrift für Operations Research, 1992, 36(1): 3-21.
|
[11] |
SHAPLEY L S. Cores of convex games [J]. International Journal of Game Theory, 1971, 1(1): 11-26.
|
[12] |
RAPOPORT A, GOLAN E. Assessment of political power in the Israeli Knesset [J]. American Political Science Review, 1985, 79(3): 673-692.
|